Remote on-boarding of individual customers (2026-09-03)

Circulars Email: HKMA E-mail Alert of 04 September 2026 (05:00 p.m. HKT)

Document Information

Title: Remote on-boarding of individual customers (2026-09-03)

Type: Circulars

URL: https://brdr.hkma.gov.hk/eng/doc-ldg/current/20260902-1-EN

Email Received: 2026-09-04 19:11

Summary Created: 2026-09-04 14:00

English Summary
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Management Summary
  • Purpose / Background: The HKMA has issued this circular to update regulatory expectations for remote individual customer on-boarding, necessitated by rapid technological advancements and the increasing prevalence of sophisticated fraud, including deepfake-driven impersonation and large-scale mule account networks.
  • One-line conclusion: AIs and SVF licensees must conduct a comprehensive review of their remote on-boarding systems and adopt a proactive, intelligence-led risk-based approach to mitigate evolving AML/CFT threats.
  • Key Changes:
  • Updates and consolidates requirements from previous circulars (2019 and 2021).
  • Shifts focus toward proactive, ongoing system recalibration to address AI-driven threats (e.g., deepfakes).
  • Emphasizes the integration of threat intelligence shared by the HKMA and the Hong Kong Police Force into operational controls.
  • Reinforces two core principles: (i) rigorous identity document authentication and (ii) incontrovertible identity matching.
  • Encourages the adoption of "tiered" account functionality based on dynamic ML/TF risk assessment and customer behavior.
  • Key Dates / Deadlines: Effective immediately (3 September 2026).
  • Applicability / Impact scope: All Authorized Institutions (AIs) and Stored Value Facility (SVF) licensees in Hong Kong.
  • Recommended management actions:
  • Conduct an immediate comprehensive review of current remote on-boarding solutions.
  • Incorporate the latest fraud and scam intelligence from the HKMA/HKPF into system designs.
  • Implement continuous updates and recalibration programs for on-boarding technology.
  • Evaluate the feasibility of implementing a tiered account structure to scale transaction limits based on risk.
  • Ensure active senior management oversight of remote on-boarding performance and AML/CFT effectiveness.
Detailed Summary

1) Document overview
This circular updates the HKMA's requirements for remote customer on-boarding to align with the current ML/TF risk landscape. It supersedes the 2019 and 2021 circulars on the same subject while maintaining the validity of prior circulars concerning corporate on-boarding (2020) and thematic AML/CFT reviews (2020).

2) Main requirements
AIs and SVF licensees must ensure their remote on-boarding processes adhere to two fundamental principles:

  • Identity Authentication: AIs must use technology to verify the genuineness of identity documents and ensure the reliability of data/information collected electronically.
  • Identity Matching: Institutions must use appropriate technology to link the customer to their provided identity "incontrovertibly."
  • Risk-Based Approach: Institutions are expected to design products using a tiered model, where account features, functionality, and limits are scaled dynamically based on the customer’s risk profile and ongoing behavioral patterns.

3) Key changes

  • Focus on Evolving Threats: The policy now explicitly addresses risks posed by AI-driven automation, specifically deepfake technology and large-scale impersonation.
  • Intelligence-Led Controls: Institutions are now formally expected to leverage intelligence provided by the HKMA and the Hong Kong Police Force to ensure their systems remain effective against current modus operandi.

4) Important dates & transition

  • Effective Date: 3 September 2026.
  • Transition: Ongoing; institutions are expected to integrate these requirements into their current AML/CFT program immediately.

5) Impact and risks

  • Operational/IT: Requires continuous investment in upgrading verification technology to counter "sophisticated tactics" like deepfakes.
  • Compliance: Increased expectation for proactive system recalibration rather than static compliance.
  • Strategic: Potential shift toward dynamic/tiered account management to balance user experience with heightened risk controls.

6) Compliance action checklist

  • [ ] Review current remote on-boarding technology against the two core principles (Authentication & Matching).
  • [ ] Update internal AML/CFT manuals to include intelligence-sharing protocols with HKMA/HKPF.
  • [ ] Assess system capabilities for "tiered" account functionality.
  • [ ] Brief senior management on the results of the comprehensive system review.

7) Appendices/attachments summary
N/A (No appendices provided in the source text).

中文摘要
快速切換摘要區塊
管理層摘要
  • 目的/背景: 鑒於金融科技創新及遙距開戶普及,同時為應對深度偽造(Deepfake)、AI 自動化詐騙及傀儡戶口網絡所帶來的洗錢與恐怖分子資金籌集(ML/TF)風險,金管局更新遙距開戶的監管期望。
  • 一句話結論: 機構須對遙距開戶系統進行全面審視與持續校準,並落實「身份認證」與「身份匹配」兩大核心原則,以防禦日益升級的冒充與欺詐風險。
  • 關鍵變更:
  1. 取代 2019 年及 2021 年舊有相關通函。
  2. 強調引入 AI 偵測技術以應對深度偽造等新型詐騙。
  3. 要求將遙距開戶系統納入「持續更新與校準」的風險管理循環。
  4. 明確要求必須將金管局與警方分享的最新詐騙手法情報納入控制措施。
  5. 推動採用基於風險的「分層開戶」模式(Tiered approach),根據客戶風險動態調整帳戶功能與交易限額。
  • 重要日期 / 截止日: 即日(2026年9月3日)生效。
  • 適用對象 / 影響範圍: 所有認可機構(AIs)及儲值支付工具持牌人(SVF Licensees)。
  • 管理層建議行動:
  1. 全面盤點: 審視現有遙距開戶流程,識別防範深度偽造及自動化攻擊的控制盲點。
  2. 系統升級: 配置能核實證件真實性及進行生物特徵精確匹配的技術。
  3. 動態風險管理: 實施分層帳戶控制,按客戶實際使用行為與風險評級動態調整權限。
  4. 情報整合: 建立機制,確保將警方及金管局發布的最新詐騙情報自動納入 AML/CFT 系統參數。
  5. 強化監督: 高層需明確對遙距開戶系統的有效性負責,並落實持續性的測試與 recalibration 程序。
詳細摘要

1) 文檔概述
本通函旨在更新金管局對個人客戶「遙距開戶」的監管期望,直接取代 2019 年及 2021 年的舊通函。適用於所有認可機構(AIs)及儲值支付工具(SVF)持牌人,重點針對日新月異的科技詐騙(如 Deepfake)造成的 ML/TF 風險。

2) 主要要求
機構必須確保系統符合兩大核心原則:

  • 身份認證 (Identity Authentication): 利用電子渠道獲取客戶數據時,必須採取適當措施確保所獲信息與證件的真實性(須利用科技手段驗證)。
  • 身份匹配 (Identity Matching): 運用適當技術,確保所驗證的身份與實際申請人存在不可爭辯的關聯(Incontrovertible link)。

3) 關鍵變更

  • 風險觀點: 由單純的合規核對轉向「主動防禦」,特別是針對 AI 驅動的欺詐攻擊。
  • 管理模式: 強調「持續校準」(Continual recalibration),而非「一勞永逸」的設置。
  • 彈性控制: 引入「分層 approach」,鼓勵機構依據客戶風險剖析及實際行為,動態調整交易限額與帳戶功能。

4) 重要日期與過渡安排

  • 生效日期: 2026 年 9 月 3 日。
  • 過渡要求: 既有開戶系統需配合上述要求進行全面審視,並根據金管局與警方分享的最新情報持續更新。

5) 對機構的影響與風險

  • 技術風險: 若系統無法識別深度偽造技術,將面臨極高帳戶接管與開戶詐騙風險。
  • 營運影響: 需建立與警方情報對接的機制,IT 及合規部門需協作完成系統的動態調整。
  • 合規風險: 若遙距開戶程序過時,將被視為未履行 ML/TF 風險防控義務。

6) 合規動作清單 (Checklist)

  • [ ] 執行遙距開戶系統的全面風險評估(Gap Analysis)。
  • [ ] 更新自動化身份驗證程序(導入 AI 抗偽技術)。
  • [ ] 實施分層帳戶權限管理邏輯。
  • [ ] 建立接收並採納警方情報的內部 workflow。
  • [ ] 確保高層監管報告中包含遙距開戶系統的效能審視。

7) 附件/附錄摘要

  • 本文件為獨立通函,無附件。
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